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such as an erroneous dismissal of the jury,'1 4 or the mistaken release
of the accused after a hearing by a magistrate, rather than on the
merits of the case.' 5 The plea of former jeopardy will not be available although all other prerequisites are present in cases where the
jury has failed to reach a verdict, 16 where the court is compelled to
adjourn before the verdict is reached, 17 where a judge or juror is
taken sick or dies,' 8 where a juror is disqualified,' 9 or where a mistrial is declared on motion of the accused.2 0 The court, following a
long line of adjudicated cases in this state,21 correctly ruled that the
relator could utilize the void judgment obtained against him by the
state as a basis for his plea, religiously upholding his constitutional
right. It was an excellent opportunity for the Court of Appeals to
impress upon the lower courts the necessity for a strict adherence
to adjective law.
M. M. B.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-PERSONAL INJURY TO WIFE IN FOREIGN
STATE-WIFE TO BRING ACTION IN NEW YORK-PUBLIC POLICY-

CONFLICT OF LAws.-Plaintiff sues in New York to recover for per-

sonal injuries sustained by her in Connecticut through the negligence
of her husband in the operation of an automobile in which the wife
was a passenger. Such actions are maintainable in Connecticut,' while

"In New York the dismissal of the jury is governed by the CoDE

PR0C. § 428.

OF

CRIM.

Compare Peo. v. Warden, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911)
(where the discharge of the jury not in accordance with § 428 and without the
consent of the defendant was held to be an acquittal by operation of law) with
Peo. v. Montlake, 184 App. Div. 578, 172 N. Y. Supp. 102 (2d Dept. 1918)
(held, no acquittal, when the judge discharged the jury by necessity and the
defendant did not object).
Compare Peo. v. Goldfarb, 152 App. Div. 870, 135 N. Y. Supp. 62 (1st
Dept. 1912), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 664, 17 N. E. 1083 (1914) (where a further trial
was barred when the magistrate ordered the discharge of accused and a new
complaint drawn up) with Peo. v. Dillon, 194 N. Y. 254, 90 N. E. 820 (1910)
(where the discharge of the accused by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing
was held not to be a bar to further prosecution).
' Peo. v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187 (N. Y. 1820); Peo. v. Hays, 166 App.
Div. 507, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1075 (2d Dept. 1915).
' Peo. v. Fishman, 64 Misc. 256, 119 N. Y. Supp. 89 (1909); Peo. v.
Neff, 191 N. Y. 210, 83 N. E. 970 (1908) (manifest necessity).
" Peo. v. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. E. 814 (1902) (illness of juror).
" Gardes v. U. S., 87 Fed. 172 (C. C. A. 5th, 1898).
- Peo. v. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 478 (1881) ; Peo. v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 413,
17 N. E. 413 (1888); Peo. v. McGrath, 202 N. Y. 445, 96 N. E. 92 (1911)
(The plea being a personal one, the constitutional privilege is deemed waived
when an appeal on the case is had.).
'King v. Peo., 5 Hun 297 (N. Y. 1875) ; Peo. v. Warden, 202 N. Y. 138,
95 N. E. 729 (1911).
'Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914).
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RECENT DECISIONS

in New York the common-law doctrine that in marriage persons of
husband and wife become merged still prevails to the extent that2
neither is liable for injuries wrongfully inflicted upon the other.
Held, that the New York courts will not take jurisdiction to enforce
a foreign cause of action which is repugnant to the public policy of
the forum. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
A cause of action for personal injuries is transitory and liability
follows the person and may be enforced in any forum which can obtain jurisdiction of the wrongdoer. 3 The ordinary rule, as to asserted
torts, transitory in character, is that the law of the place where the
injury was inflicted governs the right of action, and that the law of
the forum determines the jurisdiction of the court, the capacity of
the parties to sue or be sued, the remedies which are available to
suitors and the procedure to be followed in the court.4 To justify
the application of the law of the forum, the rule of the foreign state
must not violate the public policy of the forum.5
What is meant by public policy? The term is vague, loose and
illusory. In the leading case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. 6 the public policy was perceived to be the doctrine "that rights lawfully vested
shall be everywhere maintained." In the instant case the court reiterated a definition of public policy it had formerly adopted 7 from
a non-conflict case, 8 viz., "the law of the state whether found in the

constitution, the statutes or judicial records."
Legal definitions invite and provoke criticism because they rarely
prove perfectly accurate. This one is no exception to the rule. It
seems questionable that the New York policy in the above mentioned
non-conflict case is applicable to a conflict of laws situation, 9 for a
strict literal application of the definition of public policy would abrogate completely the fundamental conflict of laws rule, by bringing
every case within the exception. Thus it would logically follow that
if the lex loci and lex fori clash, it would be sufficient to preclude the
2 Caplani v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935); see Allen v.
Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927); cf. Schubert v. Schubert Wagon
Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928).
Chicago & E. I. Ry. v. Rouse, 178 II. 132, 52 N. E. 951 (1899); see
also Boydon v. Phil. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E.
1075 (1916).
'Dorff v. Taya, 194 App. Div. 278, 185 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dept. 1920).
'Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918) ("If
aid is to be withheld here it must be because the cause of action in its nature
offends our sense of justice or menaces the public welfare. * * * They (the
courts) do not close their doors unless help would violate some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deeprooted tradition of the commonweal.").
lbid.
Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E.
564 (1930).
'People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1, 51 N. E. 257 (1898).
0
REsTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAws (1934), N. Y. Annotations §612.
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court from taking jurisdiction of the matter.10 This conclusion would
12
be contrary to the weight of authority, both of cases 11 and writers.
The opinion does say that "the courts do not close their doors
unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of
the commonweal." The court could have based its decision solely on
this broader concept of public policy without attempting to reconcile
it with the juridical definition.
Whether this reciprocal disability, which precludes a suit by one
spouse against the other for personal injuries, would be promotive of
the public welfare is a debatable question. Sound reasons have been
given in support of both sides. 13
In the instant case the court took the position that the rule of
law exists by tradition and authority, that "rights may not be granted
or withheld by our courts at the pleasure of the judges to suit the
individual notion of expediency and fairness," and any changes must
be addressed to the legislative, not the judicial branch of the
government.
D.R.

LIMITATION OF AcTiONS-SECTION 16, CIVIL PRACTIcE AcTIN INTErnST."-The plaintiff insur-

WHAT CONSTITUTES "UNITED

ance company issued a life insurance policy to defendant's husband
on June 13, 1930, defendant being named as beneficiary. The policy contained a one-year incontestability clause. On April 24, 1931,
plaintiff brought this action to rescind the policy on the grounds of
"0(1931) 79 U.

oF

PA. L. REv. 635.

"In all conflict of law cases it is

obvious that there must be two conflicting rules of law, that of the foreign
state and that of the forum. The rule of the foreign state is to be applied
by the forum unless the public policy of the state of the forum is violated.
But if the public policy of the state of the forum is conceived to be identical
with its law there would never be occasion to resort to the law of the foreign
state for by hypothesis the law of the foreign state is contrary to the law
of the forum; it is therefore contrary to the public policy of the forum and
the situation is that in which the forum will refuse to apply the foreign law."
' Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918) (court
rejected the doctrine that in the absence of similarity of the foreign statute
which created the cause of action and our own statute the action could not
be maintained) ; see also Chicago & E. I. Ry. v. Rouse, 178 Ill. 132, 52 N. E.
951 (1899).
" GooDRIcK, Public Policy it; the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W. VA. L.
Q. 156; BE~cH, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 656; BEAL, CONFLIcr OF LAws (1935) § 612. "Differences ;n
law do not necessarily constitute a sufficient basis for a declaration that the
rule of the foreign state is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum."
" Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927), Pound, J. (dissenting opinion); Contra: Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N. Y.
1863).

